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CONFLICT OF CONSTITUTIONS? NO 
THANKS: A RESPONSE TO PROFESSORS 
BRILMAYER AND KREIMER 
Gerald L. Neuman* 
The role of the third participant is to disagree. While I have. no 
desire whatever to encourage interstate regulation of abortion, the ter-
ritorialist sol~tions that my colleagues have chosen in order to isolate 
state abortion regulation pose other dangers. 
Both Professor Brilmayer and Professor Kreimer argue not only 
that a state may make abortion legal within its borders, but also that 
the federal Constitution requires all other states to treat as lawful any 
abortion performed in such a prochoice state. Kreimer's right-to-
travel analysis appears to endorse the use of state borders as a means 
for evading relational duties. Brilmayer's analysis, grounded more in 
the prerogatives of territorial states than in the rights of mobile indi-
viduals, gives the state where an act occurs power to make preemptive 
grants of autonomy that override relational duties imposed by other 
states. In my view, these analyses overemphasize location and under-
emphasize relationship as a basis for legal obligation. 
This colloquy was organized around the unpleasant hypothesis 
that the Supreme Court would overrule Roe v. Wade 1 and that Con-
gress would not fill the resulting void with federal legislation. The 
abortion debate would then move to the states, where local majorities 
could enact their own resolutions. If the local majorities were large 
enough, they could even write their local resolutions into their state 
constitutions.2 The contrasting state constitutions that could result 
• Professor of Law, Columbia University. A.B. 1973, Harvard; Ph.D. 1977, M.I.T.; J.D. 
1980, Harvard. - Ed. I owe particular thanks to Lea Brilmayer, Larry Kramer, Seth Kreimer, 
and Michael Schill. 
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
2. As Justice Blackmun recognized in Roe, 410 U.S. at 154-55, the Supreme Court's holding 
was preceded by state constitutional holdings that favored abortion rights in People v. Belous, 
458 P.2d 194, 197 (Cal. 1969) (decided on both state and federal due process grounds), cert 
denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970), and State v. Barquet, 262 So. 2d 431, 435-36 (Fla. 1972) (state due 
process holding only). For post-Roe state constitutional activity on the subject of abortion, see, 
for example, ARK. CoNST. amend. LXVIII, § 2 ("The policy of Arkansas is to protect the life of 
every unborn child from conception until birth, to the extent permitted by the Federal Constitu-
tion."); R.I. CONST. art. I, § 2 ("Nothing in this section shall be construed to grant or secure any 
right relating to abortion or the funding thereof."); CommitteeTo Defend Reproductive Rights 
v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779, 798-99 (Cal. 1981) (holding that exclusion of Medi-Cal payments for 
elective abortions violated state constitutional right to privacy); Moe v. Secretary of Admin. & 
939 
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might then replicate the comparativists' current juxtaposition between 
the U.S. Constitution and the constitutions of Germany and Ireland. 
In some states, prohibition of abortion would be constitutionally re-
quired, while other states would give constitutional recognition to a 
woman's right to choose. 
Federal preemption principles and federal rights doctrines do not 
ordinarily distinguish between state statutes and state constitutional 
provisions as objects of federal displacement. That Brilmayer and 
Kreimer offer no separate analysis of such a variation on their hy-
potheticals is therefore understandable. But I hope to show that this . 
variation underlines some of the troubling aspects of territorialism, 
and particularly of Brilmayer's proposals concerning preemptive 
grants of autonomy. 
Consider first the following, concededly strained, hypothetical: 
The Utah constitution recognizes a "right to life" for all fetuses con-
ceived within the state by resident parents and requires the state to use 
all available means to protect them from abortion. The California 
constitution recognizes a woman's right to reproductive autonomy, in-
cluding termination of pregnancy, and encourages (but does not re-
quire) public officials to facilitate that right. While attending an 
academic convention in California, the Dean of a Utah state university 
meets one of his professors, who tells him that she has just traveled to 
California to have an abortion. Rather than dissuade the professor or 
report the imminent abortion to other Utah authorities, the Dean ac-
companies the professor to the clinic and helps her to pass through a 
crowd of antiabortion demonstrators who are picketing there. Upon 
return to Utah, is the Dean subject to discipline, or is Utah required to 
recognize the abortion, the assistance, and the complicit silence as law-
ful because of California's superior authority over all persons within 
its territory? 
I. PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS 
Federal constitutional arguments in a post-Roe world would be af-
fected by the particular reasons that the Supreme Court gave for over-
ruling Roe. If the Court concluded that states had a compelling 
interest in potential life from the moment of conception,3 then this 
Fin., 417 N.E.2d 387, 397 (Mass. 1981) (holding that exclusion of medically necessary abortions 
from Medicaid coverage violated state due process guarantee); Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 
A.2d 925, 928, 933-37 (N.J. 1982) (holding that exclusion of medically necessary abortions from 
Medicaid coverage violated state equal protection guarantee in conjunction with state constitu-
tional right to privacy). 
3. See, e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 519 (1989) (opinion of 
Rehnquist, C.J.). 
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interest could outweigh other constitutional rights like the right to 
travel. If the Court recognized fetuses as "persons" for some or all 
purposes, then a post-Roe analysis would vary accordingly. On the 
other hand, if the reversal rested solely on positivist arguments from 
"original intent" or history that circumscribed a right to abortion as 
outside the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment, 4 but said no more, 
then the federalism implications of abortion regulation would require 
closer examination. 
Without Roe v. Wade, a positivist would likely find nothing in the 
Constitution to preclude a state from recognizing a fetus present 
within its borders as the object of legal duties. To speak of the fetus' 
domicile, and make the common domicile a basis for regulation of the 
woman's relationship with the fetus, might then make sense. Simi-
larly, without Roe, a state would have greater discretion to confer legal 
rights on the biological father in his relationship with the woman and 
the fetus. The Court's condemnation of a spousal veto in Planned 
Parenthood v. Danforth 5 might not survive once the Court had with-
drawn recognition from the woman's right to choose to terminate her 
pregnancy. 
I will not stress the criminalization of abortion, which Kreimer 
emphasizes, but rather civil regulation. I will look to situations where, 
for example, the biological father of the fetus might sue in the state of 
common domicile to enjoin the woman from leaving the state for the 
purpose of having an abortion or to enjoin the imminent abortion once 
she has left the state. 6 The biological father might be suing to enforce 
his own state-conferred rights, or on behalf of the fetus, which shares 
the common domicile. Questions of legality in the civil sense are more 
common in conflicts between state constitutions. Kreimer's argu-
ments draw on a tradition of distinctive concern with extraterritorial 
criminal laws in the interstate context. If the Federal Constitution 
places stricter limits on state criminal jurisdiction than on civil regula-
tion, this may result from the history of criminal procedure at com-
mon law rather than from generally valid principles about the 
regulatory structure of federalism. 1 
4. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2874 (1992) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
5. 428 U.S. 52, 67-72 (1976). Compare Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2830-31 (invalidating spousal 
notification requirement) with 112 S. Ct. at 2871-72 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (justifying 
spousal notification requirement). 
6. Cf. Doe v. Doe, 314 N.E.2d 128 (Mass. 1974) (rejecting estranged husband's effort to 
enjoin abortion). 
7. Thus, Kreimer's attempt to limit the implications of Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412 (1981), 
by arguing that the domicile state cannot forbid its citizens to travel interstate for the purpose of 
committing an act that it cannot make an extraterritorial crime, are weakened to the extent that 
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Brilmayer's phrasing of the alternatives as a choice between pre-
scriptive jurisdiction based on residence and prescriptive jurisdiction 
based on territory seems ill-suited to describe the subject of this collo-
quy. Jurisdiction based on residence also encompasses questions like 
whether a New York resident who becomes pregnant while attending 
law school in Palo Alto is subject to New York or California law. As 
Kreimer emphasizes, however, the socially important phenomenon is 
interstate travel for the purpose of abortion. We are talking about 
what the Germans call abortion tourism, 8 a brief departure from the 
state for the sole purpose of enjoying a less restrictive legal regime. 
If we must make ascriptions of territorial situs, then we may best 
regard the reproductive autonomy of a New York resident attending 
school in California as, for the moment, situated in California. In con-
trast, when a woman spends her entire life in Pennsylvania except for 
one day spent in New Jersey for the sake of terminating a pregnancy, 
to regard her reproductive autonomy as situated in New Jersey may 
make less sense. The activities that cause us to place so high a value 
on reproductive autonomy, and the burdens that will result if repro-
ductive autonomy is denied, including the resulting relationship with 
an unwanted child, are overwhelmingly situated in Pennsylvania. 
Nonetheless, let me concede arguendo that the territorial situs of a 
right to terminate pregnancy should always be identified with the state 
where the procedure is performed. 
As Brilmayer emphasizes, we are living in the modem world, 
where federal constitutional law does not aspire to identify a unique 
state with the right to govern each transaction, and frequently differ-
ent rules would apply in the courts of different states if the litigation 
were to occur there.9 Congress could choose to adopt national con-
flicts rules, and it could indeed resolve the issue of interstate regulation 
of abortion by enforcing Brilmayer's proposal and compelling other 
states to respect "preemptive" laws of a situs state. The Supremacy 
Clause makes valid federal statutes prevail over state constitutions.10 I 
limits on extraterritorial crimes are a relic of the vicinage requirement. See Seth Kreimer, The 
Law of Choice and the Choice of Law, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 451 (1992). 
8. See, e.g., Judgment of Feb. 25, 1975, 39 BVerfGE 1, 88 (dissenting opinion) 
(''Abtreibungstourismus"); Michael G. Mattern, Comment, German Abortion Law: The Un-
wanted Child of Reunification, 13 LoY. L.A. INTL. & CoMP. L.J. 643, 686-87 (1991). 
9. Lea Brilmayer, Interstate Preemption: The Right to Travel, the Right to Life, and the Right 
to Die, 91 MICH. L. REv. 873, 882-83 (1993). Brilmayer expressly argues that the residence state 
can forbid activities that are merely lawful in the situs state when the situs state does not seek to 
grant a preemptive right to engage in those activities. Id. at 897-98. The modem retreat from 
constitutional supervision of interstate conflicts is generally traced to Alaska Packers Assn. v. 
Industrial Accident Commn., 294 U.S. 532 (1935). See, e.g., ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIG, A 
TREATISE ON THE CoNFLICT OF LAWS 13-15 (1962). 
10. U.S. CoNST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
March 1993] Conflict of Constitutions? 943 
do not believe, however, that the Constitution itself imposes 
Brilmayer's territorialist preemption rule. 
A due process complaint based on uncertainty rings particularly 
hollow in the case of individuals who travel interstate for the sole pur-
pose of avoiding duties to others arising under home state law. Vari-
ous ana1ogies come to mind, and teachers of Conflicts can no doubt 
think of others.11 Some involve remova1 of children; 12 another in-
volves a trustee who removes a trust asset in order to dispose of it in a 
state whose law of fiduciary duty is weaker;13 and a more melodra-
matic example involves a custodian who removes a prisoner overseas 
for the purpose of defeating habeas corpus jurisdiction.14 
II. AN INTERNATIONAL ANALOGY, DISTINGUISHED 
Professor Kreimer notes some European examples of intemationa1 
travel for the purpose of escaping nationa1 restrictions on abortion. 
The German response, attempting enforcement against extraterritoria1 
acts, reflects the concern that the state should not abdicate its constitu-
tiona1 responsibility to restrict abortion by overlooking such travel. 
An American state might similarly. view its constitution as requiring 
its officia1s to prevent its citizens from traveling out of state to obtain 
abortions. 
One method for confining the state's law to its own borders would 
be to deny that the state constitution can impose duties on its officia1s 
outside the state. This method recalls the arguments often made by 
federal officia1s in recent years that their actions outside U.S. borders 
were not controlled by the U.S. Constitution. The trend was acceler-
ated by the Supreme Court's holding in United States v. Verdugo-Ur-
quidez 15 that the Fourth Amendment did not constrain federa1 
officia1s' search of a nonresident alien's home outside the United 
States. The government has a1so sent the Coast Guard onto the high 
seas to intercept Haitian refugees before they reach U.S. waters and 
argued that it could then process them outside the constraints of U.S. 
statutory and constitutiona1 law.16 
11. E.g., C. Steven Bradford, What Happens if Roe is Overruled? Extra-Territorial Regula-
tion of Abortion by the States, 35 ARIZ. L. REv. (forthcoming 1993). 
12. See, e.g., Alfieri v. Alfieri, 733 P.2d 4 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987) (making award of custody to 
mother, whose move to California was motivated by desire to impair visitation rights of father, 
contingent on her return to New Mexico). 
13. Cf. ROBERT A. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CoNFLICTS LAW 390-92 (3d ed. 1977) (noting that 
administration of trust is governed by law of place of administration). 
14. See ROBERT J. SHARPE, THE LAW OF HABEAS CORPUS 17-18, 192 (1976). 
15. 494 U.S. 259 (1990). 
16. See, e.g., Barbara Crossette, U.S. Expanding Refugee Center as More Haitians Flee 
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Neither Kreimer nor Brilmayer, however, argues that the Consti-
tution imposes a territorialist solution to international conflicts.17 
Kreimer bases his argument on a morally pluralist federal union, with 
a stress on national unity. 18 Brilmayer argues that the Constitution 
gives priority to the state of territorial situs as a matter of interstate 
accommodation within federalism, but not that the Constitution com-
pels a similar international comity.19 Indeed, in the international con-
text, there is a name (even mentioned in the Constitution) for giving 
the claims of territorial situs absolute priority over the claims of citi-
zenship. The name is "treason. " 20 
My colleagues' analyses do not make the formal error of giving 
conflicts rules hierarchical priority over constitutional law, nor do 
they support the claim that the U.S. Constitution is restricted to U.S. 
soil. Both of them seek homes within the federal Constitution for a 
mandatory rule resolving conflicts between the laws of two states in 
certain cases differently than international conflicts are resolved. 
Nonetheless, we should not lose sight of Verdugo-Urquidez and the 
dangerous claim that constitutions do not oblige a government's offi-
cials outside its borders. If we take state constitutionalism seriously, 
then it would be puzzling to conclude that the U.S. Constitution for-
bids extraterritorial effect for state constitutional rights while requir-
ing extraterritorial effect for federal constitutional rights. 
III. INTERSTATE SEARCH AND SEIZURE 
While interstate abortion conflicts are novel, a considerable body 
of case law and literature has addressed the state constitutional ana-
logue to Verdugo-Urquidez, a search by state officials outside their own 
borders that would violate the state's own standards but might be law-
ful where performed.21 Suppose, for example, that Oregon police pur-
sue into California a burglar suspected of a series of crimes on both 
Homeland, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1991, at A6 ("In a rare appearance before a district court the 
Solicitor General of the United States, Kenneth Starr, told Judge C. Clyde Atkins that Haitians 
stopped at sea while trying to flee to the United States have no rights under American laws."), 
17. Indeed, Brilmayer is on record to the contrary. See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer & Charles 
Norchi, Federal Extraterritoriality and Fifth Amendment Due Process, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1217 
(1992). 
18. Seth Kreimer, "But Whoever Treasures Freedom ..• ": The Right to Travel and Extrater· 
ritorial Abortions, 91 MICH. L. REV. 907, 917-21 (1993). 
19. Brilmayer, supra note 9, at 877-78. 
20. U.S. CoNsr. art. III, § 3. 
21. The validity of the search ofVerdugo-Urquidez's residence in Mexico under Mexican law 
was not resolved. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1229 (9th Cir. 1988), 
revd., 494 U.S. 259 (1990). A fully specified analogy would also require that the person being 
searched was not a resident or citizen of the state whose officials conducted the search. 
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sides of the border and conduct a search that is legal under California 
and federal law but violates the Oregon Constitution. 
Much of the case law and literature on interstate search-and-
seizure conflicts focuses on the remedial question of the exclusionary 
consequences,22 which the manipulability of deterrence analysis has 
unduly complicated.23 Instead, let us focus directly on the substantive 
question of the legality of the search: Does the federal Constitution 
prohibit Oregon courts from regarding the search as a violation of 
their state constitution because it was legal under California law? 
For the Oregon court, the first question is one of constitutionalism, 
not conflict oflaws - whether the Oregon constitution limits the pow-
ers of state officials even when they act extraterritorially. Absent ex-
plicit language or "legislative history" of the state constitution, 
answering this question requires the court to examine some of the fun-
damental assumptions of constitutionalism as viewed in Oregon. The 
state constitution may, for example, rest on a natural rights philoso-
phy that regards state constitutional rights as reflecting universal 
moral rights that may overlap with the federal constitutional rights.24 
It may hinge on a social contract theory that treats constitutional limi-
tations as the preconditions for all exercises of the sovereign power 
granted to the state by its people in its constitution.25 Either of these 
alternatives could make state constitutional rights presumptively ap-
plicable to Oregon officials when they exercise sovereign power outside 
Oregon's borders.26 Both theories have deep roots in American 
constitutionalism. · 
Alternatively, Oregon might view its constitution in a skeptical, 
positivist light, as an organic statute for one territorial subunit among 
many in a federal system. An Oregon court might then conclude that 
rights outside its borders, even against actions of its own officials, are 
remitted for their protection to federal law and the laws of sister 
states, plus any extraterritorial legislation the Oregon legislature might 
22. See, e.g .• 1 WAYNER. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT § 1.5(c) (2d ed. 1987); John B. Corr, Criminal Procedure and the Conflict of Laws, 
73 GEO. L.J. 1217 (1985); Mary J. Morrison, Choice of Law for Unlawful Searches, 41 OKLA. L. 
REV. 579 (1988); William H. Theis, Choice of Law and the Administration of the Exclusionary 
Rule in Criminal Cases, 44 TENN. L. REV. 1043 (1977); Richard Tullis & Linda Ludlow, Admis-
sibility of Evidence Seized in Another Jurisdiction: Choice of Law and the Exclusionary Rule, 10 
U.S.F. L. REv. 67 (1975). 
23. See Morrison, supra note 22, at 579. 
24. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Rights: American and Human, 19 COLUM. L. REV. 405, 408-09 
(1979). 
25. See id. at 408-09; Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 YALE L.J. 909, 976-78 
(1991). 
26. Neuman, supra note 25, at 916, 979-80. 
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choose to enact from time to time. Moreover, different portions of a 
constitution may reflect different constitutional visions because of his-
torical accretion or contemporaneous compromise. Unremitting posi-
tivism seems to me an impoverished form of constitutionalism,27 but 
this is a matter for Oregonians to decide. 28 
The identification of the constitutional vision informing rights pro-
visions, however, is a question of fundamental local law. If the court 
determines that state constitutional rights by their rationale apply extra-
territorially, then there is no room for applying state conflicts law. 
Constitutional analysis trumps interest analysis (among other method-
ologies), and a state supreme court that is confident of the theory of 
rights underlying its constitution may have access to a binding source 
of insight on the reach of state law that is absent in most conflicts 
cases.29 
The Oregon court may still have to consider the question raised by 
Brilmayer's "preemption" analysis, however: Does afederal conflicts 
rule oust the Oregon constitution in this case? In other words, does 
territoriality trump the governance relationship established by Oregon 
between its own police and individuals subject to their authority, so 
that California may give the Oregon police powers, enforceable in the 
courts of their own state, that the Oregon constitution forbids? 
Now, the California law permitting the search may not yet "pre-
empt" according to Brilmayer's standard, because it does not express 
an affirmative policy in favor of the police's autonomy to search. If 
the hypothetical requires supplementation, then let me add the as-
sumption that the legality of the search under California law results 
from an amendment to the California Constitution that expressly 
trims back search-and-seizure rights in California to be no greater 
than federal search-and-seizure rights.Jo 
27. See id. at 984-87 (stressing need for rights to legitimate state's exercise of power). 
28. As I will emphasize, the Federal Constitution imposes some limits on a state's choice 
among models of constitutionalism. These derive from such sources as the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Republican Form of Government Clause. I believe that 
the models discussed in the text are within the range of permissible choices. 
29. See Lea Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent, 78 MICH. L. 
REv. 392, 393 (1980). 
30. Such an amendment was part of Proposition 115, the "Crime Victims Justice Reform 
Act" package adopted by initiative in 1990. However, the California Supreme Court invalidated 
this package of amendments on the ground that it amounted to a wholesale revision of the Cali· 
fornia Constitution, which could not be accomplished by initiative. See Raven v. Deukmejian, 
801 P.2d 1077 (Cal. 1990). A similar amendment to the Florida Constitution, limited to search 
and seizure, was adopted in 1982. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12. 
Proposition 115 was preceded in 1982 by a successful amendment by initiative that prohibited 
the California courts from suppressing evidence except where required by federal law or by a 
state statute enacted by a supermajority in the legislature. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(d); see In re 
Lance W., 694 P.2d 744 (Cal. 1985); cf. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988) (holding 
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One might still object that California constitutional policy does not 
really address searches by Oregon police, even searches that occur in 
California. I could embellish the hypothetical further in response, but 
this seems the appropriate place to observe that a similar ambiguity 
occurs within Brilmayer's analysis of "Roe-like" state abortion rights. 
State laws that legalize abortion, or provisions that enshrine a state 
constitutional right to abortion, recognize a woman's autonomy, but 
autonomy vis-a-vis whom? 
Brilmayer's preemption analysis appears to neglect the relational 
character that rights usually have in U.S. constitutional law. In U.S. 
constitutionalism, most (though not all) constitutional rights operate 
as rights against state action. More specifically, rights within a consti-
tution usually run against the government structured by that constitu-
tion. 31 U.S. constitutional rights do not generally run against 
Germany,32 and California constitutional rights do not generally run 
against Oregon. There are exceptions; both federal and state constitu-
tional rights can run against the world generally, including private and 
governmental parties. 33 But the federal constitutional right to choose 
under Roe and Casey has been, like other due process rights, a right 
against state (and federal) action only.34 A state law autonomy right 
that elimination of state suppression remedy for state constitutional violations did not violate 
federal due process). 
31. Cf. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 382-84 (1896) (holding that Bill of Rights does not 
bind tribal government); Barron v. Mayor ofBaltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 249 (1833) (holding 
that Bill of Rights, not expressed as binding on states, bound only federal government). This 
phrasing requires acceptance of a characterization of the U.S. Constitution as partly restructur-
ing the governments of the states. 
32. Brilmayer's discussion of the Rushdie affair seems to imply that, so long as Roe stands, 
for Germany to punish a German woman for having an abortion in the United States would 
"offend American constitutional law." Brilmayer, supra note 9, at 890-91. Certainly we would 
not extradite (because of the principle of double criminality), and we would not enforce German 
law ourselves, but I do not see how Roe would preclude Germany from punishing the woman if 
she returned voluntarily. 
33. See, e.g., ARK. CONST. art. XIX, § 13 (setting maximum lawful rates of interest); KY. 
CoNST. § 241 ("Whenever the death of a person shall result from an injury inflicted by negli-
gence or wrongful act, then, in every such case, damages may be recovered for such death, from 
the corporations and persons so causing the same."); Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 
U.S. 74, 88 (1980) (finding no federal barrier to state court's recognition of state constitutional 
right of access to private shopping center for free speech and petition purposes); United States v. 
Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 760 (1966) (holding federal right to interstate travel secured against private 
interference). State constitutional rights that ran against the federal government would inher-
ently raise federal preemption problems. 
34. This is now explicitly stated in Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753 
(1993). I should not cite this case without adding that a footnote in one of the dissents endorses 
the result for which my colleagues argue. See 113 S. Ct. at 792 n.31 (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that, if Roe were to be overruled, then "a woman's right to enter another State to obtain 
an abortion would deserve strong protection • . . . [T]he diversity among the States in their 
regulation of abortion procedures would magnify the importance of unimpeded access to out-of-
state facilities."). 
948 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 91:939 
would not be "Roe-like" if it ran against the world generally (includ-
ing the woman's husband, her parents, her church, and her employer) 
and prohibited all retaliation against a woman who has an abortion. 
Perhaps I am mistaken in this respect. As a Fourteenth Amend-
ment holding, Roe v. Wade ran against all the states. Would a "Roe-
like" state law right run against the granting state and all its sister 
states? A recent search-and-seizure case from the actual state of Ore-
gon gives equivocal support for this possibility. In State v. Davis, 35 the 
Supreme Court of Oregon expressed the view that, if the defendant's 
arrest by Mississippi police in Mississippi had violated the standards 
applicable under the Oregon equivalent of the Fourth Amendment,36 
then evidence resulting from the arrest could not be introduced in an 
Oregon prosecution. 37 The court insisted that "the government can-
not obtain a criminal conviction through the use of evidence obtained 
in violation of a defendant's rights under that provision."38 Further-
more, "[i]t does not matter where that evidence was obtained (in-state 
or out-of-state), or what governmental entity (local, state, federal, or 
out-of-state) obtained it; the constitutionally significant fact is that the 
Oregon government seeks to use the evidence in an Oregon criminal 
prosecution."39 The last-quoted clause, however, suggests that the Or-
egon constitution did not really contain a legal "right" binding on 
Mississippi police, but rather that Oregon treats the exclusionary rule 
as a constitutional right at trial, like the right against introduction of 
coerced confessions.40 The court's primary focus on the exclusionary 
rule has distracted it from being precise in its legal characterization of 
the conduct of the Mississippi police. The Oregon search-and-seizure 
clause might "secure" a preexisting moral right, but it legally secures 
that right against the Oregon government. The court's casual mention 
of federally obtained evidence strengthens this impression - under 
the Supremacy Clause, Oregon cannot impose more stringent regula-
tion of arrests on federal officers over federal objection, although it 
35. 834 P.2d 1008 (Or. 1992). 
36. OR. CONST. art. I, § 9 ("No law shall violate the right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search, or seizure; and no warrant shall 
issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath, or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized."). 
37. See 834 P.2d at 1011-13. The court deemed it necessary to decide whether Oregon con-
stitutional standards applied before evaluating the constitutionality of the arrest. 
38. 834 P.2d at 1012. 
39. 834 P.2d at 1012-13. 
40. The Oregon Supreme Court also rejects the U.S. Supreme Court's current view that the 
exclusionary rule is justified solely by its deterrent effects. See Davis, 834 P.2d at 1012; State v. 
Davis, 666 P.2d 802, 807 (Or. 1983) (different defendant). 
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need not accept the evidence they proffer.41 Thus, at second glance, 
the analysis returns to the proposition that the Oregon constitution 
binds Oregon courts and prosecutors, giving the search-and-seizure 
provision unusually broad scope but remaining consistent with the 
phenomenon that states normally constitute themselves. · 
Let us assume, however, that Californians are so upset by crime 
that they want to permit police agents of any government to be free to 
search and seize on California soil to the maximum degree permitted 
by the federal Constitution. Do federalism principles prevent Oregon 
from imposing stricter standards on its own police, even when they 
operate in California? Do the structural assumptions of U.S. federal-
ism give such priority to territoriality that they require that California 
law can free Oregon officials from all state constitutional constraints 
when they travel into California on official business? 
Surely not. The federal Constitution makes only one reference to 
state constitutions, in the Supremacy Clause, which expresses the as-
sumption that states will have constitutions and that the judges of the 
states will apply them.42 The Constitution also assumes that states 
will have their own citizens. Article I assumes that states have elected 
legislatures, and Article IV requires that each state have a republican 
form of government. Popular sovereignty at the state level means that 
the people of the state confer powers on their own government. 
Although the supremacy of federal law sometimes enables the larger 
populace of the nation to augment those powers, the federal Constitu-
tion evidences no intention to give sister states equal authority to aug-
ment the powers of a state in a manner binding in its own courts. As 
the Supreme Court explained in Nevada v. Ha/l 43 upholding Califor-
nia's power to make Nevada subject to damage liability in California 
courts for torts committed in California: 
In this Nation each sovereign governs only with the consent of the 
governed. The people of Nevada have consented to a system in which 
41. See, e.g., State v. Mollica, 554 A.2d 1315, 1324-30 (N.J. 1989) (holding records seized by 
federal officials in manner prohibited under New Jersey constitution admissible unless federal 
officials acted in cooperation with state officials). See generally Jill E. Fisch, Turf Wars: Federal-
State Cooperation and the Reverse Silver Platter Doctrine, 23 CRIM. L. BULL. 509 (1987) (arguing 
that, by inducing federal law enforcement agents to comply with state search-and-seizure rules, 
state courts may be exceeding their authority under the Supremacy Clause). 
42. U.S. CoNST. art. VI, cl. 2; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 44 (James Madison) (Roy P. 
Fairfield ed., 2d ed. 1981): 
[Absent the Supremacy Clause,] as the constitutions of the States differ much from each 
other, it might happen that a treaty or national law of great and equal importance to the 
States would interfere with some and not with other constitutions, and would consequently 
be valid in some of the States at the same time that it would have no effect in others. 
Id. at 132. 
43. 440 U.S. 410 (1979). 
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their State is subject only to limited liability in tort. But the people of 
California, who have had no voice in Nevada's decision, have adopted a 
different system. Each of these decisions is equally entitled to our 
respect.44 
Thus, the fundamental assumption of U.S. federalism that the 
states are territorial units45 must be limited by the fundamental as-
sumption of U.S. federalism that states are themselves constitutional 
systems. The latter assumption prevents a state from making effective 
grants of "autonomy" to officials of another state, enforceable in the 
courts of their own state, despite the territorial "preemption" analysis 
that Brilmayer suggests. 46 
To return to the abortion hypothetical with which I began, the 
"preemption" analysis would equally fail to override the Utah right to 
life. The federal Constitution would not require Utah to respect Cali-
fornia's effort to confer on the Utah Dean autonomy to facilitate an 
abortion for a Utah employee while they were both in California. The 
presence of the Dean, the professor, and the fetus in California does 
not empower California to "preempt" the Dean's duties toward the 
fetus under Utah law. 
IV. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 
All the foregoing might be dismissed on the ground that state offi-
cials are not private citizens and that the priority of territoriality over 
residence of private citizens is consistent with a more deferential ac-
commodation of territoriality and state constitutionalism.47 True. 
But my point is that the "preemption" analysis gives excessive atten-
tion to the power of territorial states based on the location of particu-
44. 440 U.S. at 426 (emphasis added). The dissenters would have gone further and required 
California, as a matter of constitutionally required interstate comity, to accept Nevada's asser-
tion of sovereign immunity in California courts. See 440 U.S. at 431 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); 
440 U.S. at 432-33 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
45. See Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional 
Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 CoLUM. L. REv. 249, 315-20 (1992). Professor Laycock, how-
ever, interprets territoriality as giving presumptive preference in cases of "longstanding relation-
ships" to "the law of the place where that relationship is principally located." Id. at 319. 
46. For clarity, I should perhaps point out that I am not arguing in favor of a formalistic 
federal rule permitting a forum court to give absolute priority to its own constitution over the l!lw 
of any other state in all cases. Formally, the people of a state are free to put anything they want 
into their constitution, but not everything is entitled to equal federal respect. A state cannot 
impose damage liability on the officials of sister states whenever they search its citizens in the 
other states, because due process limits the authority of the state to impose duties on unsuspect-
ing nonresidents in other states. Nor can a state declare all fetuses in the country to be its 
citizens and protect them against abortions everywhere, for the same reason and also because 
federal law determines who counts as a citizen of the state for federal constitutional purposes. 
47. See Brilmayer, supra note 9, at 885-86 & n.49 (accepting internal affairs doctrine for 
corporations). 
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lar acts while neglecting the jurisdictional implications of the 
relationships among those involved in the acts. 
The impression of neglect of relationships is reinforced by Profes-
sor Brilmayer's suggestions concerning guardians and the right to die. 
She concludes that, even in the absence of a federal right to die, a state 
cannot appoint a guardian for an incompetent patient and empower 
the guardian to move the patient from one hospital to another without 
also empowering the guardian to remove the patient to another state 
for the purpose of terminating the patient's life under the laws of that 
state. The preemptive effect of the other state's law makes the home 
state's limitations on the guardianship relation created under its laws a 
violation of the right to travel and an unconstitutional intrusion on the 
authority of the other state. Under this "preemption" analysis, the 
Constitution would not permit the home state to effectuate its concern 
that a guardian may abuse such ultimate powers over one of its citi-
zens, 48 so long as the guardian could find some other state that was 
more trusting. 
The use of geographical mobility to evade responsibilities that re-
sult from a relationship by leaving the jurisdiction where the relation-
ship arose produces opportunities for some at the expense of damage 
to others. The federal government does not always accept such eva-
sions in international conflicts, and the federal Constitution does not 
require the states simply to accept them in interstate conflicts. 
To apply this reasoning to prohibition of abortion, one would have 
to characterize abortion as violating a relational responsibility. The 
relationship may be to the father of the fetus or to the fetus itself as a 
future citizen of the state. One need not go so far as to endorse extra-
territorial regulation based on the state's relationship with the woman 
as one of its citizens. I agree with Professor Kreimer that, after the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the U.S. Constitution leaves even less room 
for a Rousseauian conception of citizenship at the state level than at 
the federal level. Kreimer writes, however, as if regulation of abortion 
were a matter of the state's imposing regulation of morals in the ab-
sence of tangible harm, and a woman's subjection to such regulation 
were based on a generalized duty of obedience to law. In a post-Roe 
world, an antichoice state would justify its legislation as prevention of 
harm to persons or almost-persons who were entitled to its protection 
48. But cf. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 281-82 (1990) (recogniz-
ing legitimacy of this concern, in intrastate context). I am assuming arguendo the correctness of 
this decision for the purpose of discussing its interaction with federalism, not taking a position on 
the decision itself. 
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and who had not consented to travel to another jurisdiction for moral 
experimentation at their expense. 
Insisting on a relational context for abortion, and characterizing a 
woman's termination of her pregnancy as an infliction of harm, may 
sound like subordination of the woman. But that is a reason for re-
taining Roe v. Wade, as I hope we will. This colloquy is struggling 
with the implications of a world without Roe. 
